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At War in Swaddling Clothes: 
Stirner’s Unique One as a 
Conative Existence
Abstract
In its simplest and primary sense, conatus is about self-preservation. It further involves 
the obligation, the duty, the imperative even, deriving from the Law of Nature for man 
to do whatever within his power to maintain his life. Even though this idea has been an 
old one, it was reintroduced in a more sophisticated form by modern philosophy as no 
longer a cruel necessity of life but ontologically tied to Reason and Natural law. It was 
with Hobbes that the idea of self-preservation was put at the core of his anthropological 
narration (with well known political connotations) and with Spinoza that conatus was 
delved into within his ontological universe. Regardless of their ontological starting 
points, both philosophers ended up eventually in a resolution with regard to that primary 
anthropological tension between individuals, whether this was a common legislator, the 
political society or the state. Somewhat radical at the beginning, Hobbes and Spinoza had 
to make some mitigations in order to arrive at a resolution. Yet, that was not Stirner’s 
case. On the contrary, Stirner’s opening ontological statement was rather too extreme 
and inconceivable even: it is also the newborn child that gets to war with the world and 
not only the other way around. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that this extreme 
trailhead leads the Stirnerian egoist to his fulfillment as the Unique One through ownership 
and that this agonistic tremendous striving constitutes the Stirnerian notion of conatus. 
That notion offers no resolution to the ontological animosity between individuals; on 
the contrary, that animosity is required as ontological precondition and prefiguration of 
conatus' conclusion as well.
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I. Stirner in the making
This would be a rather short essay if Stirner had quit reading Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect right after its first pages and, in particular, this passage: “Our first priority must be to lay down 
certain rules for living, as being good rules [first of which is]: To speak to the 
understanding of the multitude and to engage to all those activities that do 
not hinder the attainment of our aim. For we can gain no little advantage from 
the multitude, provided that we accommodated ourselves as far as possible 
to their level of understanding.”1 To begin with, even the appeal for a set of 
good rules for living would be something rather unacceptable for Striner, 
let alone that first rule being engaging with the multitude and its degree of 
understanding. This is of course an imaginary scenario and, for the sake of it, 
we may suppose as well that Stirner was a careful reader. Therefore, he could 
not but have noticed a passage prior to the above mentioned which probably 
made him rather angry: 
I shall state briefly what I understand by the true good, and at 
the same time what is the good true. In order that this may be 
rightly understood, it must be borne in mind that good and bad 
are only relative terms, so that one and the same thing may be 
said to be good or bad in different respects.2 
In addition, Stirner must have also gotten in touch with Spinoza’s thought 
through its Hegelian interpretation. Spinoza was, for centuries, one of 
the most notorious philosophers, whose thought came to be synonymous 
with the notions of atheism and materialism. Surely this would be another 
reason for a young Stirner – a notorious thinker in the making – to continue 
reading the works of his predecessor. Stirner declared his philosophy as a 
(non)system that radically breaks up with every philosophy prior to him. 
Such a disputatious declaration, not only in its sharpness and radicalism but 
also in its structure, reflected his unwillingness to acknowledge anyone as 
his philosophical ancestor. However, while continuing to read the Spinozist 
Treatise, he would discover a precious ally in his major endeavour, i.e., the 
radical undermining of abstract thinking and of the various phantoms that 
enslave the human mind.3 Certainly, rejecting theoritically abstract thinking 
1 Baruch Spinoza, “Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,” in Ethics, Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect, Selected Letters, ed. Seymun Fedman, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Indianapolis Hackett Pub. Co., 1992), 236.
2 Ibid., 235.
3 He would have read, for instance: “Starting form universal axioms alone, the intellect cannot 
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along with its consequent ideological and political implications could either 
be the deliberate outcome or the ultimate goal of a philosophical structure 
that had to arrive there through specific reasoning, based on the grounds of 
a corresponding ontology. If this rejection was an outcome which, in order 
to be accomplished, required the previous rejection of the basic ontological 
dualism, i.e. the mind/body dualism, Spinoza was Stirner’s man of interest, as 
was also Hobbes for that matter. Nevertheless, even the rejection of the mind/
body separation, however deep in uprooting traditional and highly respected 
notions and dangerously radical with regard to its political implications, was 
not as radical as the one that preceded it: the interpretation of man as a 
creature with the sole primal duty of self-preservation, of survival. This was 
by no means a modern idea, not even an early modern one, as it originated 
way back in Western thought. We would not oversimplify the matter if we 
suggested that it has not served as the basic ontological layer until the first 
major ontologies of modern philosophy introduced by Spinoza and Hobbes. 
In Hobbesian anthropology, man’s duty for self-preservation was declared as 
the first natural law: 
The Right of Nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, 
is the liberty each man hath, to use its own power, as he will 
himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say 
of his own Life; and consequently of doing anything, which in 
his own Judgment and Reason he shall conceive to be the aptest 
means thereunto.4 
So, “What is radical about it?” one may ask and that would be a fair question. 
However, we should not forget that the unquestionable duty of man to 
preserve his existence by all means necessary was now accompanied by, or, 
better put, was now grounded on its ontological parallel, i.e. the interpretation 
of man as mere matter, mere body, mere existence, as res extensa. Spinoza’s 
version of that radical ontology, the one-substance doctrine, was rather 
more sophisticated than Hobbes’s. It nevertheless served the same goal or, at 
descent to particulars, since axioms are of infinite extension and do not determinate the 
intellect to contemplate one particular thing rather than the other,” ibid., 257. The political 
implications of that undermining of abstract thinking and of ideological phantoms was by no 
means sprang out of just one source, no matter what Stirner would had to say about that: 
“From seeing [liberals] individuals as primary and society secondary, from seeing individuals as 
more ‘real’ than society and its institutions it is not a great step to seeing social institutions 
as ‘logical fictions’ […] it follows that no rational person could elevate the supposed interests 
of fiction above the real interests of real individual people,” Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and 
Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 38.
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 90.
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least, led to the same consequences: the materialistic interpretation of man. 
This consisted an absolute necessity for the anthropological premises of the 
polemical ontology of the Enlightenment and, more precisely, of the Radical 
Enlightenment: 
Spinoza […] was perfectly aware of the radical implications of 
his ideas and the violent reaction they were likely to provoke, 
since his philosophy stood in total contradiction to the tenets 
of all forms of Christianity, as well as Cartesianism and the 
mainstream of the western tradition since the end of antiquity 
[…]. Spinoza and spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone 
of the European Radical Enlightenment everywhere.5 
Israel, rather fairly, stresses the importance of Spinozism with regard to the 
political radicalism of Enlightenment.6 However, that radicalism took various 
forms and expressions, sometimes awkward and, most times, dangerous. In 
order to, at least, do justice to Hobbes’s intentions – the English philosopher 
may be regarded as the “philosopher of the weak”7 – that Hobbesian 
ontological starting point was the beginning of a line that traversed 
Enlightenment’s body and connected some strange figures such as Meslier, La 
Mettrie, Sad, and Stirner as well for that matter. 
II. But, at the beginning was Hobbes. And Spinoza
As above mentioned, the idea that all things and later also man have an 
innate inclination to maintain their existence was not new. The Stoics had 
entertained it, but Aristotle had already said something about it too. In 
Medieval philosophy it was connected with motion and, as expected, it got 
characteristically complicated and debated upon. However, in regard to our 
issue here, it was by Descartes that the idea of conatus (as the technical term 
5 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93, vi.
6 “Spinoza with his one-substance doctrine […] extends this ‘revolutionary’ tendency appreciably 
further metaphysically, politically, and as regards man’s highest good than do […] Hobbes,” 
Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind. Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of 
Modern Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.
7 That is Martinich’s characterization of Hobbes: “Nietzsche celebrates the exercise of power 
for its own sake […] Hobbes praises that the exercise of unrestrained power inevitably ends in 
premature death […] Nietzsche is the philosopher of the strong, Hobbes is the philosopher of 
the weak,” Aloysius Martinich, Hobbes. A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 351. 
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came to be) was reintroduced in a modern physics’ mechanistic sense.8 That 
was undoubtedly a big step, for a distinct part of that mechanistic universe 
was man. Yet, Descartes’ dualistic mind/body notion held back this radical 
potential which modern physics embodied, i.e. materialism. Hobbes was much 
more determined with respect to that matter and, regardless of his personal 
and theoretical ambiguities, he could not but have forseen the radical 
outcome of his theories, at least with regard to his conception of the body. 
For Hobbes the body was just extensia, a corporeal substance, mere matter. 
Furthermore, as all substances are material, then they are all bodies: 
According to that acceptation of the word, Substance and Body, 
signifies the same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeal 
are words, which when they are joined together destroy one 
another.9 
So, man has/was one substance, a material one, a body, and, furthermore, has 
a duty ordered by the Law of Nature to preserve it in any case and within its 
power. If there is one attribute that we can ascribe to the body, that is motion. 
As a result, every human action can be explained as elementary movements of 
the body. Hobbes distinguishes between two kinds of motion: 
There are two sorts of Motions […] one called Vital; begun with 
generation and continued without interruption through their 
whole life […]. The other is Animal Motion, otherwise called 
Voluntary Motion […]. These smalls beginnings of Motion, within 
the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking 
and other visible actions, are commonly called Endeavor.10 
Endeavor is Hobbes’s technical notion for conatus. Furthermore, as 
motion is the beginning of everything and, according to Hobbes’s analysis, 
8 See, for example: “It is important to note the gloss Descartes gives to the conatus […] where 
an attribution to a conatus to a body is said to mean that the body will in fact travel in 
a rectilinear direction, unless it is prevented by doing so by another cause,” Daniel Garber, 
Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 354.
9 Hobbes, Leviathan, 236. For his and Descartes’ agreement on mechanism, see: “Descartes’ 
Dualism and Hobbes’s materialism notwithstanding, their theories of the world are very similar 
in that each tried to give a mechanistic explanation of all physical phenomena,” Aloysius 
Martinich, A Hobbes Dictionary (London: Blackwell, 1995),10. Hobbes focuses on the concept 
of conatus in De Corpore as the most important element of his “rational mechanics.” Leibniz’s 
own version of the notion reflected Hobbes’s precedent, see Howard R. Bernstein, “Conatus, 
Hobbes and the Young Leibniz,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 11, no. 1 (1980): 
26. Leibniz referred to conatus as the gate to philosophy.
10 Hobbes, Leviathan, 44.
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imagination is the first internal beginning of every voluntary motion, it comes 
as a consequence that the separation of mind and body as well as of their 
faculties is undermined and rejected.11 At this point, it is important to bear 
in mind that this tendency for motion is not some inherent power of the 
body. It is rather determined by the movement of other bodies. Moreover, 
whatever is in motion maintains this motion, unless something hinders it, or, 
to better put it, regardless or despite of, or even against the opposite power 
exercised on it by the other body.12 According to the most awkward but also 
significant application of the notion of conatus in man’s State of Nature, 
bodies – meaning people – are moving in order to preserve their lives, turning 
against each other as their motion inevitably meets the motion of others. 
This is a highly individualistic state, a natural habitat where moving monads 
collide and all of them are being involved in a constant war against every 
other. However, even if the problem is presented in an individualistic world, 
its solution is only plausible within a world of collaborating citizens/subjects.
Hobbes’s individualistic ontology resolves into the totality (of the 
sovereignty) as a way out of that frightful state of nature must be offered. 
Namely, that state where autonomous and isolate individuals wage war 
against each other in order to fulfill their primary duty, self-preservation. 
Surely one might notice that prior to that frightful individualistic state stands 
the universality of the self-preservation duty common to all people. In any 
case, this is what Spinoza says: 
I’ve demonstrated all theses conclusions from the necessity 
of human nature, however it may be considered. That is, I’ve 
demonstrated from that universal striving all men have to 
preserve themselves, a striving in all men, whether they’re wise 
or ignorant. So however we consider men, whether as guided 
by an affect or by reason, the result will be the same. For the 
demonstration is universal.13 
The issue here is necessity – universal by its nature and particularized within 
human nature – and, furthermore, another layer of universality, that of 
the striving for “all men to preserve themselves.” Layers of universality, 
11 Bernstein stresses the importance of conatus’ “initial appearance in Hobbes as a means to 
resolve the mind-body problem,” and in a reversed direction from Leibniz’s emphasis, i.e. from 
mind to body, see Bernstein, “Conatus,” 37. 
12 See Juhani Pietarinen, “Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” The Paideia Archive: 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11 (1998): 144.
13 Baruch Spinoza, “The Political Treatise,” in The Collected Works of Spinoza, v. I, ed. and 
trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 524.
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ontologically structured the one upon the other, result in an interpretation 
of the world as a universality of necessity. It is at this exact point that Spinoza 
discovers the only plausible meaning of human freedom through the following 
reasoning: man has no free will because he is free only to the extent of his 
obligation to preserve himself in order to be his own master. Thus, 
a man can’t be called free on the grounds that he can not exist, 
or that he can not use reason; only insofar as he has the power 
to exist and have effects, according to the laws of human nature, 
can he be called free.14 
Even so, one should pay attention at this point, because no matter how 
universal that necessity or that strive might be, it is the individual, the human 
monad, that this necessity and striving apply to. After all, Spinoza’s thought is 
not so far apart from Hobbes’s since, according to his State of Nature, people 
are enemies – as they are for Hobbes – because they are for the most part 
guided by their passions. Therefore, people are “by their nature enemies.”15 
Additionally, each one is governed by his own right, as long as he is capable 
of fending off every force that threatens him and of living according to his 
mentality. This procedure is clearly connected with or guided by the striving 
for self-preservation defined by one’s power. Even in the Spinozist version of 
that common idea, each one’s right applies as far as his power does. At this 
point – as was also the case with Hobbes – an answer must be offered, a way 
out has to be demonstrated. Thus, Spinoza proposes what would be expected 
from him to, which is the foundation of a civil society, a state that will enforce 
a common law, a universal right above the contradictory particular rights. 
However, this is not merely a technical solution as one might think of that 
of Hobbes’s. On the contrary, it is grounded on an ontological assumption: 
Since it’s futile for one person alone to try to protect himself 
from all others, it follows that as long as human natural right is 
determined by each person’s power, and belongs to that person, 
there is no human natural right. What’s more, it’s certain that 
each person can do that much less, and so has that much less 
right, the greater the cause that has for fear. To this we may add 
that men can hardly sustain their lives and cultivate their minds 
without mutual aid.16 
14 Ibid., 510.
15 Ibid., 513.
16 Ibid. (emphasis added), 513. Here is Spinozist conatus in its both senses, self-preservation and 
the cultivation of mind. In the next paragraph Spinoza states his agreement with Stoic’s notion 
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We have to admit that the necessity of men joining together in order to 
sustain their lives is an ad hoc ontological condition, one that someone may 
as well argue that is only a practical method connected to the ontological 
obligation of conatus. After all, what is happening at the primal ontological 
level is that men are “bound to live and to preserve themselves, as far as they 
can by their own power.”17 Still, at the same time, it is necessity that bounds 
people to collaborate in order to succeed. Since necessity constitutes the 
universal ontological condition, it comes as a result that it is man’s unique 
ontological condition. Necessity dictates that without mutual help men 
live in utter wretchedness, and are inevitably debarred from the cultivation 
of reason; [so in order] to live safely and well men had necessarily to join 
together, which could only happen within a state.18 What is really at stake 
here is the cultivation of reason, naturally, as man ought to adjust his living 
to the dictates of reason. What comes next is something that would probably 
make Stirner very angry: A man who is guided by reason should be more free 
in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, 
where he obeys only himself.19
III. The unique hand of the Unique One
Whatever their differences, Spinoza and Hobbes hold something in common 
that was of much importance: the idea that there is no such thing as free 
will. That idea may be explained in terms of the absolute predominance of 
necessity, provided that necessity is framed within the broad cosmological 
notion of Nature.20 Whether Nature is God, as in Spinoza, or God is matter, 
of man as a social animal. The same in Ethics: “[Men] can hardly live a solitary life; hence, the 
definition which makes man a social animal has been quite pleasing to most,” Baruch Spinoza, 
“Ethics,” in The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 217. In this of course Spinoza departs from Hobbes.
17 Baruch Spinoza, “The Theological-Political Treatise,” in The Collected Works of Spinoza, v. I, 
ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 283.
18 Spinoza, ibid., 284. In Ethics, as well: “To man there is nothing more useful than man. Man, I 
say, can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than should all so agree 
in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it were, one mind and one 
body,” Spinoza, “Ethics,” 210. See also, “It is true that Spinoza proceeded form the alienated 
individualism of The Prince to the communitarianism of the Civitas Dei […]. It is part of Spinoza’s 
ethical philosophy to lend a helping hand to others and together with them to form a social 
and political life in which […] the the goals of individual freedom and the brotherhood of man 
are merged,” Robert J. McShea, The Political Philosophy of Spinoza (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), 204.
19 Spinoza, “Ethics,” 238.
20 Thus, “the very notion of a defence of necessity was indelibly associated in most eighteenth-
century minds with Hobbism, Spinozism, fatalism, immortality, and atheism.” It is quite 
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i.e. nature, as in Hobbes, the crucial idea here is that man is an inseparable 
part of Nature. There is no room, in both theories, for a concept of human 
exceptionalism, meaning that man is of another ontological status compared 
to every other thing within the natural world. Spinoza stated it like this: 
Most of them who have written about the affects, and man’s 
way of living, seem to treat not of natural things […] but of 
things that are outside Nature. Indeed they seem to conceive 
man in Nature as a dominion within dominion.21
 So, if man is mere nature, mere matter, if what distinguishes him is a matter of 
degree and not of quality, then it follows that he is subject to the inescapable 
laws of nature which is to say to the natural necessities. There is a not-so-
distant echo of that interpretation of man in Feuerbach’s critic against Stirner, 
as the latter describes it: 
Feuerbach raises the question: […] can you sever masculinity 
form what you call mind? Are your feelings, your thoughts 
unmanly? Are you merely a mere animal? What is your unique, 
incomparable and consequently sexless I?22 
Stirner was rather amused by the “sexless” allegation, but nevertheless natural 
preconditions of man were quite absent, or hardly visible, in his The Unique 
and His Property. His reply to Feuerbach’s critic, however, is illuminating 
about his thoughts on the matter. To “realize the species” is not prior to the 
realization, and the more important that realization is a “realization of your 
own.” Striner provides a clear example: 
Your hand is fully realized for the purposes of the species […]. 
But when you train your hands, you do not perfect them for the 
purposes of the species […] but you make of them how and what 
you want and are able to make them; you shape your will and 
power into them.23 
characteristic that Samuel Clarke titled one of his books A Demonstration of the Being and 
Attributes of God: More Particularly in Answer to Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza, And their Followers. 
Wherein the Notion of Liberty is Stated, and the Possibility and Certainty of it Proved, in 
Opossition to Neccessity and Fate! See James A. Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity. The Free 
Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 86, 46. 
21 Spinoza, “Ethics,” 152 (emphasis added).
22 Max Stirner, Stirner’s Critics, trans. W. Landstreicher (Oakland: LBC Books & CAL Press, 
2012), 89.
23 Stirner, 91 (emphasis added).
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That is not a species hand no more, that is a unique hand shaped by the Unique 
One. Stirner’s Unique One is a dominion within. By doing so, Stirner departs 
from what had seemed to be the main goal of Left Hegelians, especially 
Feuerbach and Marx, which was the resolution of the individual/community 
problem in the form of the species-being [Gattungswesen]. One specific 
Hegelian route 
followed by Strauss and Feuerbach leads to the affirmation of 
universality as community or shared interests, while placing 
less emphasis on the formal side, the element of individual 
willing. [That route], in the political application which Feuerbach 
together with Marx gave to it, leads to the notion of a collective 
substance or species-being.24
This particular route from Hegel, according to Bauer’s interpretation, was 
a Spinozist one. Bauer detected also a Fichtean trend in Hegel’s thought 
but – curiously enough given Fichte’s ontological emphasis in the Ego – 
he read Stirnerian thought as derived from the Spinozist route. And that is 
why Stirner took up the one side of Spinoza’s attributes of substance, that 
of thought (the attribute of extension was taken up by Feuerbach). Bauer 
ascribes to Stirnerian Unique One being a substance without any content, 
“neither physical nor physic,”25 and, by doing so, that substance becomes the 
greatest abstraction. Stirner would be happy with the former and unhappy 
with the latter. In addition, Stirner would be unhappy if someone traced back 
to Spinoza some ontological trends implicit in his thought (and to anyone, 
for that matter). Yet, what could be more Stirnerian than Spinoza’s notion of 
substance as that, which is the cause of itself, causa sui. Additionally, what 
could be more Stirnerian than that substance, which has an internal inclination 
to self-preservation, a striving to maintain itself, the conatus.26 And this is 
24 Douglas Moggach, “The Subject as Substance: Bruno Bauer’s Critique of Stirner,” The Owl of 
Minerva 41, nos. 1-2 (2009-2010): 65. See also: “Bauer derived his notion of infinite self-con-
sciousness from Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, and opposed it to the pantheistic He-
gel readings of Strauss and Feuerbach. Hegel had stressed the concept of substance as the pure 
universal that absorbed the particularity of the self and this ‘Spinozist moment’ misled a num-
ber of Young Hegelians into granting substantiality a certain independency over conscious-
ness,” Widukind De Ridder, “Max Stirner, Hegel and the Young Hegelians: A Reassessment,” 
History of European Ideas 34 (2008): 287.
25 Moggach, “The Subject as Substance,” 69.
26 Moggach claims that, “the application of this idea to Stirner, as an account of his concept of 
‘ownness’ is highly illuminating, and I take it that this is what Bauer is proposing. The conatus 
of Spinoza is the secret of Stirnerian ‘ownness,’” Moggach, ibid., 73. See also, in more general 
terms: “The concept developed by Stirner […] regarding the owner or the one and only is a 
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Stirner’s archetypical formulation of it: “Only when I am under obligation to 
no being is the maintaining of my life – my affair.”27
Already in the first paragraph of the book Stirner provides us with his 
thoughts on man as a newborn existence in the world. Those lines, by the way, 
are the closest we will come to some kind of Stirnerian anthropology. Man 
is since the time of his birth in constant and permanent war with everything 
that surrounds him. And when in war, there are only two options: victory or 
defeat. Stirner describes man’s entry in the world in rather existential terms: 
From the moment when he catches sight of the light of the 
world a man seeks out himself and gets hold of himself out of its 
confusion, in which he, with everything else, is tossed about in 
motley mixture.28 
The idea that man is in war with his surroundings is for sure too old to make any 
difference. Still, Stirner continues with some rather tempestuous description of 
the attitudes of the newborn: “Everything that comes in contact with the child 
defends itself in turn against his attacks, and asserts its own persistence!”29 
Hence, conatus is Stirner’s opening ontological statement. The striving for 
persistence is something of an ontological sparking, still in accordance with 
former formulations of the notion. But only Stirner, as far as we can tell, was 
so bold or idiosyncratic as to declare that the world is in a state of defense 
against a child. That was indeed an opening ontological statement that made 
the way for what would follow: warlike motion was directed from inwards, 
from the individual, towards the world and not the opposite. Stirnerian man 
was ontologically attacking its surroundings, not defending himself against 
them. And that constant combat was about the conatus: “Because each 
thing cares for itself and at the same time comes into constant collision with 
other things, the combat of self-assertion is unavoidable.”30 That was not an 
abstract description, since Stirner was obliged to set man – the child – in that 
state of immediate offensive war as there was no way around the primal social 
condition of man, i.e. family. There is a natural state and that is the society 
more straightforward implementation of a monadological ontology. In Stirner’s philosophy 
the owner is conceived as a monad whose conatus is manifested as the tendency to appropriate 
and to consume the world and the other monads,” Nicos Psarros, “Monadological Ontologies 
in the Wake of Spinoza: Leibniz, Hegel, Stirner, McTaggart, Tarde and Weil,” Conference Paper 
(2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319967914.
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of the child with his mother: “Society is our state of nature. Not isolation 
or being alone, but society, is man’s original state […]. We are already living 
with our mother before we breathe.”31 That primal strong bond had to be 
broken because man should freely choose his contacts and set himself free 
from the family bonds that he had not chosen. This was the beginning of an 
astounding course towards egoism through the exercise of self-will, which led 
to self-ownership: 
The politicians, thinking to abolish personal will, self-will or 
arbitrariness, did not observe that through property [Eigentum] 
our self-will [Eigenwille] gained a secure place of refugee. The 
Socialists, taking away property too, do not notice that this 
secures itself a continued existence in self-owenship.32
The egoist is not man, he is the mature, conscious and settled formation of 
the individual as a conquered potentiality. He has no right to his existence, he 
becomes an egoist only through his own effort of conquering himself. Only 
then he becomes an Owner because ownership is the exclusive possession of 
the self. To be an Owner is not to be free. Stirner is too careful to distinguish 
between the two. He admits that a certain level of coercion and restriction is 
necessary and unavoidable.33 Thus, in order to declare a field of unrestricted 
independence he moves from the field of freedom to that of ownership. The 
egoist can remain the owner even within the dominion of the State, provided 
that state sovereignty remains in the periphery of his ownership. Hence, 
that a society (such as a society of the State) diminishes my 
liberty offends me little. Why, I have to let my liberty be limited 
by all sorts of powers and by everyone who is stronger […]. But 
ownness I will not have taken form me.34 
Therefore, ownership is not freedom because freedom is the passive avoidance 
of something. It is rather the energetic possession, the outcome and the 
creation of the individual’s power. Being the outcome, ownership can only be 
31 Ibid., 286.
32 Ibid., 118.
33 “Limitation of liberty is inevitable everywhere, for one cannot get rid of everything […] 
Liberty itself, absolute liberty was exalted into an ideal and thus the nonsense of the impossible 
to come glaringly to the light,” ibid., 288.
34 Ibid., 286, 287. It comes as a result that for the egoist the State is indifferent, as long as his 
ownership remains untouched by the State, and only when the State tries to interfere only then 
the Owner “takes an active interest in it.” Otherwise, the egoist “has nothing to say to the 
State except ‘Get out of my sunshine,’” 217.
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the manifestation of power’s application. Yet, “my power is my property, my 
power gives me property, my power am I, and through it I am my property.”35 
Hence, through power I own my property, therefore I own myself. The Stirnerian 
notion of property is not that of the possession of things. On the contrary, 
property in Stirner has an extensive meaning, because “property depends on 
the owner.”36 This is firstly because it is only through power that the claim for 
something is sanctioned. Consequently, the strength of the power defines the 
extent of the ownership. Secondly, it is because property is whatever lies within 
the individual at some specific point and makes it whatever it is at that particular 
time. Lastly, it is because property is not static nor fixed, but constantly and 
potentially expanding wherever the owner has the power to do so, i.e. other 
people’s properties. The Owner declares: “I do not step shyly back from your 
property, but look upon it always as my property, in which I need to ‘respect’ 
nothing.”37 Stirner, unlike Proudhon, considers possession and property to be 
coinciding. As a result, whatever I can possess, I own it and that remains mine 
for as long as I have the power to possess it.38 This unlimited and dynamic 
notion of ownership leads to the idea that everything surrounding the egoist 
constitutes a potential possession, a field for the egoist to expand, to exploit, 
to consume. This is the definite reverse of the Kantian imperative: “For me no 
one is a person to be respected, but solely, like other beings, an object in which 
I take an interest or else do not.”39 Thus, Stirnerian egoism moves away from 
even radical forms of individualisms in the sense that he does not recognize a 
series of separate – though adjoining – individualities, but only one unique ego 
which consumes whatever is in its power and moves inwards in order to become 
the Unique One. This creates an extended circle from birth till the creation of 
35 Ibid., 171. It is on that notion of property that Stirner’s egoism is seen, as Nathan Jun 
puts it, an “extremely radical form of classical liberalism,” Nathan Jun, Anarchism and Political 
Modernity (New York: Continuum, 2012), 132. See also, Costas Galanopoulos, “Man, ‘Quite a 
World of Federations.’ The Incompatibility of Anarchism and Individualism,” Anarchism Studies 
25, no. 2 (2017): 75-88. Stepelevich on the contrary argues that “in holding that mere ego, 
abstract personality, must find its freedom, happiness and concreteness in ownership, Stirner 
plainly follows Hegel,” although he adds that “it is no accident that Stirner’s last literary 
efforts were directed to translating Adam Smith,” Lawrence Stepelevich, “Max Stirner as 
Hegelian,” Journal of the History of Ideas 46, no. 4 (1985): 611.
36 Stirner, The Ego, 230.
37 Ibid., 231.
38 “Property is conditioned by might. What I have in my power, that is my own. So long as I 
assert myself as a holder I am the proprietor of the thing; if it gets away from me again, no 
matter by what power, then the property is extinct,” ibid., 234.
39 Ibid., 291. Also: “Where the world comes in my way […] I consume it to quiet my hunger of 
my egoism. For me you are nothing but my food, even as I too am fed upon and turned to use 
by you. We have only one relation to each other, that of usableness, that of utility, of use,” 
277.
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the Unique One, which now comes to its closure: “I am not an ego along with 
other egos, but the sole ego; I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and 
my deeds.” It is this same conatus, which obliged the child to be at war from the 
very first moment of its life, that makes the Unique One: 
It is only as this unique I that I take everything for my own, as I set 
myself to work, and develop myself, only as this. I do not develop 
men, nor as man, but, as I, I develop myself. This is the meaning of 
the Unique One.40 
This is the meaning of the Stirnerian conatus. 
 
IV. Conclusion
Is the Stirnerian conatus all about the self-creation of the Unique One? If this 
agonistic striving comes to its fulfillment, to the Unique One, is that all for 
Stirner and his notion of conatus? Certainly not. After all, careful examination 
of the inner structure of that course towards Uniqueness reveals that there is 
more to it. For Stirner, it is not enough and even means nothing for the egoist 
to just preserve his existence, to just secure the continuation of his life. On the 
contrary, he states that 
I enjoy myself at my pleasure. I am not longer afraid for my life, 
but “squander” it. Henceforth, the question runs, not how one can 
acquire life, but how one can squander, enjoy it; or, not how one 
is to produce the true self in himself, but how one is to dissolve 
himself, to live himself out.41 
A qualitative level of living is therefore referred to by Stirner, self-enjoyment, 
which involves a meaningful expansion of life, not just its prolongation: “He 
who must expend his life cannot enjoy it.”42 So, what about politics? Ultimately 
even the Unique One will be obliged to live within a specific political dominion, 
within a State. In addition, in spite of his principal indifference towards it, he 
will have to engage at some point in some sort of political struggle in order to 
defend and preserve his ownership. The insurrection [Empörung] is the “political” 
application of the Strinerian conatus. That is because insurrection has nothing 
to do with the establishment and its overthrow, but only with the individual and 
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The insurrection, says the egoist, starts from men’s discontent 
with themselves, its a rising of individuals [It] leads us no longer 
to let ourselves to be arranged, but to arrange ourselves […]. It 
is only a working forth of me out of the establishment […] my 
elevation above it.43
Stirner declared the ontologically inconceivable; he did not put at war the 
world against the individual (man), but, on the contrary, the individual (child) 
against the world. The world must defend itself against the offensive warlike 
attitude of the newborn. From that point on, a tremendous agonistic striving 
begins in order for the individual to become – by its own will and power 
exclusively – the true egoist, the Owner, the Unique One; and also, in order 
to preserve its life through the expansion of its property by consuming and 
exploiting whatever is in his power and to enjoy and spend his life at his 
own pleasure as well. That is the Stirnerian notion of the conatus. Unlike 
his predecessors – notably Hobbes and Spinoza – Stirner creates a conative 
ontology that never ends up with a resolution of that primary ontological 
tension between individual human beings. All in all, no one before or after him 
dared to depart from such a radical and inconceivable ontological trailhead!
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